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Abstract
Teachers stand out amongst civil servants by virtue of their embedded position within governed communities,
their moral authority within those communities, and the relative autonomy of their work. This paper
investigates the political position of teachers in Algeria during the War of Independence from France
(1954-62). Although teachers were agents of the French state, and active in facilitating French governance in
Algeria, they were regarded with deep suspicion by the French security services, and subjected to a sustained
surveillance and repression campaign from the very first months of the war. Teachers were caught in a no-
man’s land between the French State, which employed them, and the nascent Algerian nation, whose children
they cared for in the classroom.
Based on oral history interviews with former teachers, the study of recently declassified public archives in
France and Algeria, and a critical engagement with educational research on teachers working in
disenfranchised communities, this paper investigates the difficult, and often dangerous, position teachers
found themselves in as a result of the war. We examine the routine military incursions into schools by the
French army, arrests and assaults of teachers, and how teachers sought to balance their duties of service to
education with their political resistance to colonialism. However, we also recognise the heterogeneity of the
teaching corps, and the relevance of this factor regarding relations between teachers and members of the
armed forces. The data collected for this study indicates strong disparities in the campaign against teachers,
depending on region, the teacher’s ethnicity, and on the type of school they worked in. Finally, we use this
research as a case study to discuss the tensions which can arise between the right and the left hands of state
within a situation of armed conflict.
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Introduction 
The Algerian War of Independence (1954-62) precipitated the end of France’s 
settlement colony in North Africa, which it had invaded in 1830. The war pitted the 
French security forces against an organized independence movement, principally 
represented, and ultimately won, by the Front de Liberation National (FLN) and its 
armed division the Armée de Liberation Nationale. The stakes in this conflict were 
particularly high on both sides. While for Algerians, the issue was to end over a 
century of repressive governance, for the French two factors determined their 
resolve to maintain control over the territory. First, France had recently been 
defeated and occupied by Germany, and had also been defeated by nationalists in the 
colony of Indochina. For many in France, and especially for career soldiers in the 
French Army, the Algerian War represented a test of French military prestige and 
political resolve. Second, European settlers represented approximately 1/10th of 
Algerian inhabitants, and for this reason, northern Algeria was administered as a part 
of metropolitan France. For many in France, and for many settles of European 
descent, Algeria was viewed as an integral part of the French nation.1 
These high stakes created deep rifts within the French state during the war, in 
particular between the military and civilian powers of state. The outcomes of these 
rifts have been thoroughly researched, especially as they played out between key 
senior officers in Algiers and the civilian executive in Paris, resulting in the coup 
d’état that brought de Gaulle back to power in 1958 and the failed Putsch des Généraux 
that sought to depose de Gaulle in 1961 (see, for example: Horne, 1977; Evans, 
2012; Stora, 2012). How this antagonism played out on a daily basis, between the 
lower echelons of the army and the civil services, is less well known.2 In this paper, 
my aim is to examine the politics of division and suspicion between the French 
security services and the teachers in the French educational services, the Education 
Nationale. My exposition is based on research conducted in the French ministerial 
and military archives as well as on a series of interviews with former teachers and 
pupils about their professional and political activities during the war.3 It aims to 
                                                
1 A third factor that emerged during the war was the presence of large deposits of natural gas and 
crude oil in the Algerian Sahara, the first commercial discovery of oil being in 1956. 
2 One relevant study is Sylvie Thénault’s paper on the judicial system during the war. See Thénault, 
1998. 
3 The two archives I draw material from are the Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer (ANOM) and the 
Services Historiques de la Défense (SHD), hereafter cited by their respective acronyms. Details of 
interviewees, who are referred to by pseudonyms, are included in the bibliography. The interviews 
referred to here are taken from a larger sample collected during my doctoral research on the politics 
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explain why members of the military and Interior Ministry perceived teachers to be a 
source of dissidence within the ranks of the civil service, and how teachers 
responded to this state-sanctioned persecution. 
Measures employed by the security services against teachers were not 
significantly different from the broader campaign of surveillance and control 
exercised across social fields in Algeria at that time.4 These measures can be grouped 
into two categories: surveillance and containment. Surveillance measures involved 
the ideological screening of teachers applying for posts in Algeria, the use of 
informants to track teachers’ political activities, and searches conducted within 
classrooms. Containment measures were more diverse as they had to circumnavigate 
teachers’ constitutional rights and the legal and institutional protections afforded by 
their membership to the civil service. This was facilitated by the state of emergency 
instituted in Algeria in 1955.5 The application of the state of emergency opened the 
doors to a series of repressive containment measures, including summary 
imprisonment, house arrest, physical intimidation, reassignment within Algeria or 
removal from the Algerian territory, and torture during interrogation (Prefecture of 
Algiers, 1955; Oblie, 2012; Slimani, 2012). 
While the surveillance and harassment of teachers did not differ in kind with 
practices carried out elsewhere in Algeria during the war, the reasons for targeting 
teachers were specifically linked to teachers’ unique political position and function as 
members of the state embedded within the population. The sociology of education 
has often reinforced the image of the teacher as a social puppet characterized by 
conformity and compliance (Grace, 1978). Although I agree that such attributes are 
deliberately cultivated within teachers through a series of mechanisms which I shall 
discuss further on, my study seeks to contribute to a historiography of teachers as 
active resistants to the overbearing interests of state (Giroux, 1988; Girault, 2004; 
Gaffney, 2007). Rather than reducing the work of teachers to a technocratic 
function, this framework emphasizes their ability to exercise an intellectual autonomy 
that contributes to transformative political movements (Giroux, 1988). This does not 
deny that teachers are structurally positioned and constructed by the state to transmit 
a hegemonic ideology. Rather, the point is that when individual teachers manage to 
                                                                                                                                
of education during the Algerian War. Interviewees were identified through advertisements and 
snowballing. Interviews followed a semi-structured schedule and were conducted in French. 
4 For a study of the broader practices of state-sponsored violence in Algeria during and prior to the 
war, see: Thénault, 2012. 
5 Loi no. 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l’état d’urgence et en déclarant l’application en Algérie. 
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extricate themselves from that ideology, they can use the social and cultural capital 
inherent within their technocratic role to subvert dominant interests. 
Insofar as teachers are trained as an intellectual class, they are particularly 
vulnerable to this sort of ‘defection’, which explains the high levels of official 
mistrust described in this paper. Interestingly, official anxieties about teachers in 
post-independence Algeria have received some critical attention (Alexander, Evans 
and Keiger, 2002; Kateb, 2006). But the period under French rule remains obscure in 
this regard. The thesis supported by my research is that teachers in this period were 
targeted by the security forces because they stood out amongst French civil servants 
as a potentially dissident force which could function within and against the state 
(Gramsci, 1971; Mayo, 2005). This view reflects the Marxian analysis that the state is 
the organ of one particular class, and that a key educational function of the state is to 
identify the interests of that dominant class with the common good (Marx, 2008; 
Gramsci, 1971). This view of the state’s vested interest in education is not strictly 
Marxian. Immanuel Kant emphasizes a similar point: “experience teaches us that the 
ultimate aim of princes is not the promotion of the world’s good, but rather the well-
being of their own state, so that they may attain their own individual ends. When 
they provide money for educational enterprises, they reserve the right to control the 
plans” (1904, p. 120). It may be objected that within a liberal democracy the person 
of the sovereign is dispersed amongst the electorate. Whether or not that is the case, 
French Algeria was not a democracy in any serious sense of the word. This fact is 
documented in any historical study of the colonial period; Patrick Weil (2005), for 
example, offers an overview of legal restrictions placed upon Muslims, including 
their lack of citizenship status. In this context, the educational system very explicitly 
represented French interests over those of indigenous Muslims. Those teachers who 
sought to promote the political interests of Muslims as a group violated the 
institutional function they had been assigned by the French state. 
1 The trouble with teachers 
Hostilities in the Algerian War of Independence broke out on the night of October 
31st 1954. Approximately one month later, on December 12th, the French Army 
circulated amongst its intelligence bureaus a series of maps depicting the distribution 
of communist teachers across Northern Algeria (fig. 1). These maps were printed on 
tracing paper so that they could be superimposed upon another series of maps 
depicting the distribution of “terrorist activities” since October 31st 1954 (fig. 2). 
Close observation of the examples shown does not reveal an obvious geographical 
correlation. Subsequent historical research has shown that communists within 
3
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 Figure 1: Distribution of communist teachers in Algeria, 12 December 1954. SHD, 1H, 1720, D1. 
Figure 2: Distribution of insurgent activities in Algeria, 31 October—12 December 1954. SHD, 1H, 
1720, D1. 
4
Landscapes of Violence, Vol. 3 [2015], No. 3, Art. 2
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/lov/vol3/iss3/2
Algeria were only modestly implicated in the fighting alongside the independence 
movement and they were not militarily active in the opening stages of the war 
(Horne, 1977). However, these maps are indicative of a strong anxiety amongst 
ministerial and military circles about the spread of ideologies hostile to French rule in 
Algeria. Within the context of the Cold War, anti-colonial struggles were often seen 
as a manifestation of a Soviet-backed geo-political strategy. A 1959 government 
report commissioned by the Prime Minister’s office cited that "mass communist 
organisations are engaged in an intense propaganda effort in which arguments 
favourable to the FLN are rolled into Communist positions" (Cabinet du Premier 
Ministre, 1959, p. 47). For Governor General Jacques Soustelle, France faced a three-
pronged ideological enemy in Algeria: "Russian imperialism disguised as 
communism; pan-Arabism directed from Cairo; and anti-Colonialism” (cited in Tyre, 
2002, p. 103). The correlation conjectured here between the distribution of 
communist teachers and terrorist events stemmed from a broadly held concern 
about the potential subversive trickle-down effects of ideologically unorthodox 
teachers within the classroom. These maps signal the start of an aggressive campaign, 
sustained until the end of hostilities in 1962, on behalf of the French security services 
against what was perceived to be an inner threat within the teaching corps. 
 Bad teachers, it was feared, could poison the water: by undermining French 
dominance from within the state schooling apparatus, such teachers could ferment 
popular unrest amongst the Muslim Algerian population. Thus, teachers needed to 
be singled out for surveillance in order to identify subversive elements within the 
ranks who could then be contained or expunged. Crucially, this perception was not 
the product of over-zealous petty officers; it ran down from the high echelons of the 
French state. In May 1955 (five months after the outbreak of the insurgency), the 
Interior Ministry began corresponding with the Ministry of Education about the 
urgency of reining in the threat from dissidents within the ranks of the Republic’s 
teachers. The preferred means agreed upon was to source teachers in the metropole 
and to root out the politically unsound ones before they could set foot on Algerian 
soil: 
“If I may draw your attention to the necessity of securing the 
maximum guarantees concerning the civil servants called to serve in 
the Algerian departments. Because of the events in Algeria, it is 
obvious that certain attitudes will not be tolerated on behalf of civil 
servants who are called upon to exercise a certain influence amongst 
the communities in whose midsts they live. I imagine therefore that 
you will judge, as I do, that the recruitment for the Schooling Plan in 
5
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Algeria must be carried out with sensitivity to Algeria’s particular 
situation and that it would be appropriate, in these circumstances, to 
give special attention to the advice requested from prefects on the 
candidates residing in their departments prior to the admission or 
direct nomination of any candidate for public employment.” [Interior 
Minister, 1955] 
This passage is typical of governmental correspondence on this topic, wherein the 
interlocutors employed vague generalizations to suggest adopting repressive 
measures. The issues of separatism and armed conflict that characterized the 
situation in Algeria are not evoked, nor is it ever specified which attitudes or 
opinions cannot be tolerated from teachers. These are taken as understood, and it is 
possible that the correspondents purposefully remained evasive so as not to 
inculpate themselves by proposing state-sanctioned discrimination against French 
citizens on the basis of party affiliations or political activities (these in themselves 
were not illegal at the time). Therefore, in order to ensure the political orthodoxy of 
teachers being sent to Algeria from the Metropole, the Ministry of Education agreed 
to defer to the Prefect of a candidate’s department in order to vet a candidate’s 
political orthodoxy: 
“Certainly, the elements susceptible of being sent to North Africa 
must, in addition to their pedagogical competencies which the 
Ministry of Education is best placed to assess, be absolutely 
trustworthy from a national and political point of view. Nothing 
would be more dangerous than sending to the Algerian departments 
members of the National Education corps who, by their functions, 
would contribute to aggravating the current situation. Indeed, we 
should beware of certain extremist parties who might make use of 
this occasion to infiltrate their elements into the teaching body.” 
[Prefect of Pyénées Orientales, 1955] 
This document lays out the desired division of labor between the Ministry of 
Education on one side and the Interior Ministry and Army on the other. While the 
Ministry of Education was responsible for the technical assessment and 
implementation of pedagogy, the overarching strategy of colonial education was 
directed by the right hand of state. In the words of the Prefect of Constantine: “it is 
important that we post teachers for political and psychological reasons”(Prefect of 
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Constantine, 1957).6 As the war progressed, the primary function of state schooling 
was co-opted in favor of the security agenda. In this optic, the Army and the 
Governor General’s office collaborated in the surveillance and repression of 
dissident teachers — occasionally this brought the security services into opposition 
with the Education Ministry. In 1955, the Prefect of Constantine expelled Marguerite 
Chatou, a lycée teacher, from his department on the basis that she was a militant 
communist.7 When the Ministry of Education responded by posting her to a (more 
prestigious) lycée in Algiers this was perceived as a rebuke. The Governor General 
Jacques Soustelle wrote personally to the Interior Minister to ask him to “intervene 
with the National Education Ministry to have the concerned party posted in the 
metropole, her presence being in any case undesirable in Algeria” (Governor 
General, 1955). A recurrent point of annoyance for the Army was the reluctance on 
behalf of teachers to fly the French flag or allow their pupils to participate in 
patriotic activities during school hours, as well as the Education Inspectorate’s 
refusal to intervene on behalf of the Army (Cabinet Civil, 1958). In one memo, the 
acting commander for the Eastern province of La Calle complains of the local 
inspector’s refusal to allow primary school children to attend the Armistice Day 
parade on the basis of a legal technicality: 
“In the current situation, where each occasion must be seized to give 
the population and to the youth in particular, a civic education which 
brings them closer to France to prepare them morally for a choice, it 
is profoundly regret- table that under the pretext of intransigently 
applying a legal clause, National Education civil servants deliberately 
obstruct an initiative organised for the common good.”8 [Chevalier-
Chantepie, 1960] 
While there is no indication that the Education Ministry wavered from the hard line 
adopted by the government with regards to repressing sympathy for the liberation 
movement, its actions were constrained by its own internal due process and 
(perhaps) a certain loyalty to its own agents. Any disciplinary action on the Ministry 
of Education’s part could only be taken after an internal investigation was carried out 
by one of its inspectors. This took time. It also opened the possibility of the security 
                                                
6 A historical note of interest: the Prefect of Constantine at this time was Maurice Papon, infamous 
for his active role in the deportation of Jews under Vichy and for the massacre of Algerians in Paris 
on October 17th, 1961. 
7 Names have been changed to protect the privacy of the individuals concerned. 
8 The choice referred to is perhaps the upcoming referendum on independence, although this was not 
officially announced until December 1960. 
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services being openly contradicted by a neighboring administration, and it implied a 
level of collaboration between the security services and the Education Inspectorate, 
which the former may have been unable or unwilling to engage in. The Algerian War 
was characterized by a climate of suspicion; the security classification for most 
archived cases involving teachers ranges between ‘confidential’ and ‘secret’. 
A good illustration of the inter-departmental friction that could arise between the 
security and the education services is the issue of conscripting teachers into the 
military. This raised the ire of René Billières, the Minister of Education in 1957. In 
January of that year, he wrote a letter to the President of the Council, Guy Mollet, as 
well as to the Algeria Minister and Defense Minister, to protest this practice of using 
planks from one end of a bridge to extend the other end. Noting that the 
recruitment and retaining of teachers was “an absolute priority” in Algeria, he 
laments the use of qualified teaching personnel for low-level surveillance and 
protection duties. Most of these teachers were not conscripted into the regular army 
but into local reserve units, called Unités Territoriales (UT’s). While this arrangement 
did not completely remove teachers from their posts, it raised the separate problem 
of employing teachers to police the very communities in which they taught. Not only 
did this force them to patrol in uniform and armed in neighborhoods where their 
students and their parents could see them, they could also be called upon to search 
and interrogate students’ parents. Billières, who himself had taught literature in a 
lycée, was sensitive both to the social standing of teachers and to the Muslim 
population’s antipathy to the armed forces. He warns that the practice of employing 
teachers as UT’s “can only ruin their credit with the local population” and continues:  
“The very principal of incorporating teachers within the Unités 
Territoriales completely distorts the role of French culture and of those 
entrusted with trans- mitting it in the eyes of the indigenous 
populations. What authority can they maintain, what trust can they 
inspire amongst the locals, when they are forced to participate in 
policing operations, in identity checks, and searches alongside the 
police and the C.R.S.”[(Billières, 1957] 
The main teachers’ union (the Syndicat National des Instituteurs or SNI) adopted a 
similar position on this question, on the basis that the repressive activities of the 
security services were at odds with the ideal of the Republican educational tradition 
(Desvalois, 1988). In a letter defending one of its members in his refusal to serve in 
his local UT, the SNI argued that, "in its very essence, a teacher’s position does not 
lend itself to certain activities, which may seem excessive in the eyes of the 
population and students’ parents" (SNI, 1954). However, Billières was not against 
8
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the incorporation of education into the pacification campaign tout court. Rather, he 
found that confusing the military and the cultural/psychological campaign was a 
strategic misstep. “French culture must be the most effective link between the 
indigenous populations and metropolitan France” he pressed, “in ruining this pacific 
weapon, we would commit a political error” (Billières, 1957). 
This view was not shared by his cabinet colleagues. In response, the Algerian 
Governor General’s office pointedly refused to implement any exceptions for 
teachers with regards to conscription. Members of the UT’s, they argued, “fight, 
without provocation, against adversaries who seek to destroy the very principles 
which the professor or teacher are entrusted with transmitting. What better mark of 
their attachment to their ideal could they offer than taking up arms, when necessary, 
to oppose those who aim to annihilate through terror their valuable work?” 
(Maisonneuve, 1957). This was an alternative notion of l’idéal de l’éducateur. 
The Governor General’s office also disagreed with Billières’s empirical claim 
regarding Muslims’ hostility towards French forces. In keeping with the official line 
of the French government throughout the war, this memo argues that the FLN’s 
message did not have resonance with the Algerian population and that everyday 
Muslims in Algeria were opposed to the terrorist tactics employed by the ALN. 
Moreover, the memo suggests that this position was more than a factual observation; 
it was a tenet of faith necessary to the maintenance French rule in Algeria: 
“The Resident Minister in Algeria considers that the law and order 
missions imposed upon members of the teaching corps can in no way 
ruin their credit amongst the local population, much to the contrary. 
He cannot admit [Il ne peut admettre] that missions protecting goods 
and persons can be considered as incompatible with the elevated 
ideal that the teacher conceives of his own mission.” [Ibid, emphasis 
added] 
Indeed, the Algerian War of Independence was not simply an armed struggle. Both 
the FLN and the French Army recognized that the real stake in the war was political, 
not military; they had to compete for sovereign legitimacy over the land and people 
of Algeria (Alexander and Keiger, 2002). And for that to occur, they first had to 
believe themselves in that legitimacy. For the FLN, this belief could find root in 
religious or ethnic identity, or in a socialist opposition to imperialism. For the 
French, the military campaign could not be conceived of outside or in opposition to 
the French mission civilisatrice that was best exemplified in the Republican classroom. 
A further problem with disciplining unorthodox teachers through the normal 
channels has to do with the isolated nature of teachers’ work. A teacher might be 
9
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suspected of using their classroom as a platform to disseminate subversive ideas, but 
obtaining proof of professional misconduct to justify disciplinary procedures was 
another matter. Teachers are perhaps unique amongst rank-and-file civil servants in 
terms of the amount of autonomy they have in their work and the lack of 
hierarchical oversight they are subject to. Teacher training colleges and unified 
educational bureaucracies are meant to limit teachers’ professional independence. 
These exert covert forms of control by creating an institutional network bound 
together by a common professional demographic, a centralized administration, a 
shared curriculum and examination system, and unifying goals and values 
(Rousmaniere, 1997; Tardif and Lessard, 1999). However, once the classroom door 
is closed, teachers are invested with a social authority which they can employ to 
undermine their assigned ideological function. The only witnesses to what occurs in 
the classrooms are the students, who are in a submissive position with regards to the 
teacher. While inspectorate visits aim to provide some oversight for teachers, these 
are more useful for identifying cases of pedagogical incompetence than 
manifestations of political deviance, which would not be put on display for the 
inspector’s benefit. French primary school teachers had a history of bristling at the 
centralized control to which they were subjected. For example, they were at the fore 
of movements to legalize union affiliation for civil servants, which only occurred in 
1924 (Archer, 1979; Gaillard, 2000). Moreover, the bureaucratic oversight situation 
in Algeria was particularly precarious during this period. The conflict disrupted the 
normal functions of state in many areas and Academy resources were over-stretched 
in order to catch up with bulging deficit in educational provision for Algerian 
Muslim children.9 Teachers in this period were often minimally trained, might not be 
inspected over the course of an entire school year, and in rural areas one teacher 
often had sole control over their class with no other French official on hand 
(Bouazza, 2012; Moreau, 2012). 
2 Bricolage surveillance and repression 
Whereas systemic surveillance was difficult to implement through the Education 
Ministry, a bricolage form of surveillance was carried out through the use of paid 
informants to infiltrate the education profession, as well as through unsolicited 
denouncements from pro- colonist parents and teachers. For example, in May 1955, 
                                                
9 Only about 15% of school-aged Muslims were enrolled in school in 1954, as compared with near-
full enrolment in the European and Jewish populations (Commission du Plan d’Equipement Scolaire, 
1955). 
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a concerned parent wrote to the Prefect of Algiers to denounce the subversive 
activities of a teacher from his son’s school. The teacher, he reported, had been in 
the rue d’Isly after school hours, selling copies of Liberté, an independentist 
newspaper which had already had one of its issues banned. The parent explained his 
concern thus: “In the present circumstances, it is in my opinion urgent to rid 
ourselves of educators who are preparing something other than little French [girls 
and boys]” (Anonymous, 1955). Archives from the Prefecture of Algiers show that 
the French intelligence services had informants implanted in the principal teachers’ 
unions and civil society associations related to education, who reported on 
discussions during meetings and general political tendencies (Service Départemental 
des Renseignements Généraux - Alger, 1960).10 
Where the Academy was reluctant to take action in the absence of clear proof of 
professional misconduct, the prefectures demonstrated a much lower threshold for 
the admissibility of guilt. Accordingly, they were more willing to dispense 
punishments against those teachers who had been denounced by colleagues or 
informants. Punishments such as house arrest and expulsion did not go to trial. Nor 
were they properly investigated. A security officer would write to the Prefect listing 
the accusations held against the teacher, but would not be required to produce any 
proof or original documentation validating such accusations. So long as the judiciary 
was kept out of the process, the division of labor between investigators and civil 
authority played very much in the security services’ favor. A Prefect was not obliged 
to act on the recommendation of the security services, but nor were they held 
accountable if the accusations they brought forth were false. 
Within the context of escalating violence, individual members of the military 
took more liberties with their authority. Practices of surveillance and harassment 
occurred at the initiative of soldiers low in the hierarchy. This was the experience of 
Mehdi Kadir, who worked as a primary school teacher in a Muslim neighborhood of 
Algiers during the war. While working in this district between 1959 and 1961, Kadir 
reports that Army patrols entered and searched his school on several occasions: 
Sometimes, we had [military] patrols come in [the school]. They 
would arrive, they’d kick in the cupboard doors to see if anyone was 
                                                
10 Associations monitored: Ligue française de l’ensiegnement, Associsation pour la sauvegarde et 
l’éducation de la jeunesse et le Centre Beausoleil, Groupe d’entreprises de l’education nationale, 
SNI/FEN, Synciat Indépendent des Instituteurs, Féderation d’oeuvres Laïques du département 
d’Alger, Comité Na- tional d’Action Laïque, Conseil Departemental d’Alger de l’Enseignement 
Primaire. 
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hiding in there. Well once, a patrol came in, they opened the 
cupboards and they found books by Mouloud Feraoun. He said, 
“who’s this?”. I told him, “he’s a teacher, he’s a writer and a teacher 
who taught Muslims” – back then, we said Muslims, you didn’t say 
Algerian because the Algerian nationality was ignored, simply banned, 
we said Muslims. I said, “he’s somebody who taught Muslim and 
French [children], he taught them their language”. The guy looked at 
me side- ways, he didn’t like it that I said that. For an Algerian to 
teach French to the French. So, I was about say, I was going to 
continue my discussion, I was going to tell him, “you for example, 
you would have been one of his students”, but I thought I’ll get an 
answer but the answer’ll be the machine gun. I shut up. He looked at 
me sideways but didn’t say anything. Thankfully, I didn’t say 
anything. He would have shot me in front of all my students, the 
whole class. I thought about that and I said no, not that. If I must 
die, I’ll die with a gun in my hand, but not like this. I won’t make a 
spectacle of myself. (Kadir, 2012) 
It is unclear how common these sorts of occurrences were. I have not found any 
archival evidence to suggest that the practice of having patrols search schools was 
officially authorized. However, after 1957, the Army operated with little civilian 
oversight in Algeria and often resorted to extra-legal practices (Vidal-Naquet, 2001). 
Two other historical witnesses I interviewed also spontaneously recalled similar 
incidents of military inspections in schools (Bouazza, 2012; Lemmouchia, 2013). 
What is particularly rich about Kadir’s testimony is that it reveals the underlying 
racial-religious stakes at play during the Algerian War. The French Army’s task 
during the war was to maintain Muslim Algerians under European domination. The 
Republican school had historically been used as a tool to justify and reinforce that 
domination. It propagated the myth of France’s civilizing mission by institutionally 
validating the French language, history and culture. The incorporation of a Muslim 
teacher such as Mehdi Kadir could be seen as the accomplishment of that civilizing 
mission. But, it could also undermine the implicit French claims to racial superiority 
that justified the exclusion of Muslims from the colonial polity. 
Kadir, the absent figure of Mouloud Feraoun, and the soldier instantiate a 
tenuous negotiation of power between the institution of the school and that of the 
army. What is at stake here is who has access to legitimate authority. The soldier is an 
agent of state governance, vested with the authority attributed by his race and 
legitimized violence. Kadir and Ferraoun, on the other hand, are governed colonial 
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subjects. Yet they are also vested with the legitimized authority of the teacher; they 
are integrated within the apparatus of cultural production and distribution with 
regards to French language and French culture. These two forms of authority derive 
from and serve a common source: the French state. But, within the field of state they 
jockey for ascendency. The soldier may be able to intrude into the space of 
education, but while there he is exposed to the institutional codes of the Republican 
school. Sylvie Thénault has argued that the violence of the colonial regime in Algeria 
covered a deep anxiety over its own illegitimacy: “In the hushed atmosphere of their 
offices, in the subtext of internal memos, never are the colonial authorities sure of 
themselves" (2012, p. 307). The soldier’s sideways glance at Mehdi Kadir may have 
betrayed that very insecurity. 
In his ignorance of Mouloud Feraoun, a prominent Francophone writer, he loses 
face in front of the teacher. The social capital that is invested in the teacher’s 
professional status is perceived as a threat by the soldier, all the more so because 
Kadir’s status disrupts the colonial hierarchy which positions him as a subaltern. 
Kadir and Feraoun taught the French their own language (this was true in the 
classroom, but it was also true in literary circles where Feraoun became a distinct 
voice of Francophonie). The cultural authority of the Muslim teacher posed a symbolic 
threat to the colonial order. 
Did the security services target Muslim teachers in particular for surveillance and 
harassment? This question evades a definitive answer because certain archival 
holdings remain restricted, while others are incomplete; also, as mentioned above, 
much harassment occurred outside of official channels. However, a review of the 
surveillance records from the Prefecture of Algiers can offer an indication. One list 
from 1955 records the names of forty-seven teachers engaged in activities “in favour 
of communist or nationalist doctrines”; twenty-three of which were Muslim 
(Prefecture of Algiers, 1955). Given that only 14% (approximately) of teachers 
employed by the French state in Algeria at this time were Muslim, a selection bias 
does seem to have occurred in this instance (Bureau psychologique, 1959). That is 
not surprising: all Muslims were somewhat suspect within the context of a war that 
pitted the two communities against one another. One of the reasons teachers were 
targeted by the security services was their close proximity to the Muslim population 
in an unregulated setting. Unlike other categories of civil servants, teachers had a 
vocation to interact daily with the Algerian population, and often lived alongside the 
Muslim majority, in the same neighborhoods and villages. Teachers who were 
themselves of Muslim extraction were that much more likely to be sympathetic to 
the liberation movement. 
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3 The uncomfortable middling position of teachers 
Teachers were distinct amongst French civil servants because of their ambivalent 
relation to the state. Such ambivalence derived from teachers’ professional identity, 
which divided their positional allegiance: on the one side to the state, whose cultural 
colonization project they enforced; on the other side to colonized communities, 
whose children they cared for in the classroom. Historical evidence indicates that this 
often stranded teachers in a middling position between the two sides of the war, 
resulting in the conflicts under discussion here. The notion that teachers, by virtue of 
their professional identity, occupy an uncomfortable middle ground in modern 
society has been advanced in other contexts. Gerald Grace has found that teachers 
working amongst the urban poor in Victorian England were often besieged by 
several sides: 
“The teacher was at the focal point of class antagonisms which he 
was expected to ameliorate and contain. He faced the concrete 
manifestations of poverty, misery and exploitation and its associated 
bitterness and ‘lawlessness’. He was not infrequently attacked and 
abused in his attempts to ‘civilize’ the people and his ability to survive 
in such a situation depended upon personal resilience and tenacity, 
the evolution of a system of ‘management’ and the sustaining effects 
of a Christian or missionary ideology.” [Grace, 1978, p. 31] 
Richard Johnson argues that teachers from working-class backgrounds were singled 
out as meriting particular suspicions in early Victorian England: “Identified with their 
own people, teachers might become, by their moral ascendency, ‘active emissaries for 
misrule’. The [Education Department’s] ideal was clear: the teacher should stand 
mid-way between his patrons and his clients” (1970, p. 104). A similar analysis of the 
teacher’s middling position is found in Lee Rainwater’s study of youth workers in 
American urban ghettos in the 1960’s, whom Rainwater describes as “increasingly 
caught between the silent middle class which wants them to do the dirty work and 
keep quiet about it and the objects of that dirty work who refuse to continue to take 
it lying down” (1967, p. 2). On Algeria, Fanny Colonna’s study of Muslim trainee-
teachers between 1883 and 1939 also points to an awkward middling position for 
teachers with the wrong background. According to Colonna (1973), Muslim teachers 
were assessed on their ability to function as mediators between the European and 
Muslim communities in Algeria. In order to perform this function, she argues that 
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they were socialized to maintain an “ideal distance” between the colonial and 
colonized cultures, making of them hybrid civil servants who did not fully belong in 
either camp. Such in-betweenness affected indigenous teachers elsewhere in the 
French colonial world as well. According to Jean-Hervé Jézéquel, African graduates 
of the William Ponty teacher training college in French West Africa were viewed 
with distrust by their own administration: “In the eyes of Europeans, they were 
‘detribalised’ and ‘semi-intelectuals’ suspected of being potential opponents of the 
colonial order” (2005, p. 528). 
Teachers themselves also had to grapple with the ambiguity of their position 
during the war. In my interview with Mehdi Kadir (2012), he claimed to have been 
supportive of national independence and to have paid FLN dues during the war - 
while at the same time being employed by the French state in the colonial education 
project. Indeed, during his time at the teacher training college (école normale) in 
Bouzareah, he recalls that amongst Muslim trainee-teachers, sympathy for and 
financial support of the FLN were widely acknowledged – though never revealed to 
European peers or to college staff: 
Interviewer: In 1957, you paid dues to the FLN and at the same time 
you were training to become a civil servant for the French state. Did 
you feel there was a contradiction between these two positions? Was 
it difficult for you to think that you were going to work for France at 
the same time as you were working for independence? 
Kadir: Yes, it was bothersome. Especially for me as a teacher having 
to say to our students, our ancestors the Gauls... Two thousand years 
ago our country was called Gaulle and our ancestors the Gauls. 
Kadir evokes a common passage in French schoolbooks, which evokes Gaulish 
ancestry and Gaulish resistance to Roman rule as a unifying identity narrative.11 
Although Kadir recalled being strongly committed to the humanist ideal of teaching, 
and even to the French Republican school model, he felt at odds with the work of 
acculturation that French schooling performed in Algeria. 
However, in certain contexts, this middling position could be exploited in the 
exercise of an individual’s political agency. Just as the security services feared, the 
position of schoolteacher could be used in favor of the independence movement, as 
is exemplified in the testimony of Bilal Bouazza, a head-teacher in a village school 
                                                
11 Although this passage remains remarkably vivid in the public imaginary, it is unclear how 
extensively it was actually used in French colonies. See: Denise Bouche, 1968. 
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(Makouda) in Grande Kabylie. In an interview focusing on his experiences in the 
classroom, Bouazza recalled a curious ploy he had devised in cooperation with a 
student to pass intelligence about French troops based in the village to the Algerian 
National Liberation Army (ALN) posted in the surrounding hillsides: 
Bouazza: There was intelligence passed with the students, indeed. 
There were children who brought messages. So, I would answer. 
Interviewer: So, the children would bring you secret messages? 
Bouazza: Not all. One or two. Not all. 
Interviewer: And the messages came from their parents, or who? 
Bouazza: They came from the maquis.12 
Interviewer: And what did you do with these messages? 
Bouazza: I would answer. There were questions. They asked the 
number of [French] soldiers there were. When they changed the 
guard. 
Because at the time of this interview Bouazza was in very poor health, it was difficult 
to extract much detail or precision from his testimony regarding this practice of 
passing messages with the ALN through the mediation of school children. However, 
his daughter put me in contact with one of his former students, Adlène 
Lemmouchia, who remembered taking part in this activity. In the following passage, 
Lemmouchia describes how an ALN officer, either a aspirant or a sous-lieutenant, 
came to their home one evening and enlisted his services: 
Lemmouchia: It was I think in ’58 or ’59, I only know that I was in 
class with Monsieur Bouazza. [The officer said to me], ‘you go to 
school’? I say ‘yes’. ‘What’s your teacher’s name? What class are you 
in?’ I say, ‘Bouazza’. He said, ‘Bouazza? He’s from my town!’ So in 
fact, Monsieur Bouazza, whom you met, was from Great Kabylie, 
Fort National, and this maquisard was from Fort National and knew 
the Bouazza family, who were an important family [des notables] in that 
region. He said, ‘I know him, he has an uncle who’s a pharmacist, his 
father works in the courthouse in Tizi-Ouzou. [...] You tell him, such 
and such sends you, I’m from such and such a place, and he needs to 
                                                
12 i.e. the ALN operating in the surrounding country-side. The term maquis was originally used to refer 
to the French Resistance to the Nazi occupation during World War II, and was (controversially) 
appropriated by the Algerian independence movement to describe their own resistance organization. 
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give you such intelligence’. What that intelligence was used for... in 
any case I completed the mission. 
Interviewer: So he told you exactly what they wanted? 
Lemmouchia: Oh, yes! He told me for example, ‘who’s the officer in 
charge of intelligence? Who runs the interrogations?’ To give a bit the 
organisation of the intelligence collection, ‘how do they check the 
attendance in school, which days they check?’ [...] He asked for 
names and also if there were [troop] movements, preparations. [...] So 
I did that. I got the information [from Monsieur Bouazza]. I 
remember he dictated and I wrote. 
Interviewer: You wrote it down? 
Lemmouchia: Yes, I stayed behind after class. He came back from 
the shop, I stayed behind so that we didn’t do it in front of everyone. 
He gave it to me and I transmitted it. [...] 
Interviewer: So you would wait for Monsieur Bouazza after class and 
he set you a dictation? 
Lemmouchia: [...] Monsieur Bouazza would dictate and I would write. 
To remember. Because I can’t remember the name of such a person 
and what he does. 
The same attribute that made the Army suspicious of Muslim teachers was a mark of 
confidence for the ALN. Bouazza was identified as a trust-worthy source of 
intelligence first and foremost because he was not of European descent. In all 
interviews I conducted with former teachers and students from this period, Muslim 
Algerians always signalled this difference as a validating mark of trustworthiness. 
While not all Muslims could be trusted – indeed, Bouazza mentioned explicitly that 
he never shared light of his political activities with any of the other Muslim teachers 
in his schools – the fact that a teacher was European automatically invalidated them 
from being admitted into a circle of trust. Bouazza’s ‘security clearance’ was further 
reinforced because of a common ethnic-regional heritage he shared with the ALN 
officer. They were both Kabyles and they came from the same district of Fort 
National. Even though they had never met, as far as the inter- views indicate, they 
shared membership to a common network of social proximity. In my interview with 
Bouazza, he repeatedly referred to contemporary actors as either Kabyle or not 
Kabyle – the former being a mark of integrity that he trusted in his professional and 
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political activities. The third validating factor was the distinction of the Bouazza 
family within Kabyle society. They were notables, a respectable lineage who had 
retained their high social standing under colonialism. While in other colonial 
contexts, this might have counted against them, in Algeria, prosperous indigenous 
families were not seen as natural collaborators of the colonial regime. They held 
positions of esteem, but not of overbearing dominance. The ALN officer knew 
Bouazza’s uncle was a pharmacist and his father a legal translator for the regional 
tribunal. In a European context, these were not top-of-the-pyramid occupations 
associated with old blood. But they represent above all access to learning and formal 
qualifications, which for Muslim Algerians were severely rationed by the colonial 
government.  
Bouazza’s personal indigenous identity, determined by his ethnic, religious and 
filial back- ground, confirmed his adherence to the Algerian nationalist cause, 
regardless of his status as a French civil servant. On the other side, his professional 
identity put him in a unique position to gather intelligence on the military presence in 
Makouda and transmit it to the ALN. Others have written about the ways in which 
armed conflict shapes human geography and built environments (Eyre, 1984; 
Lambert, 2012; Pullan, 2013). In rural Algeria, the conflict placed the school at a 
social intersection between the area controlled by the French Army and that 
controlled by the ALN. Like most schools in rural Algeria, Bouazza’s school was 
situated within the town, while the majority of its students lived in small rural 
enclaves in the surrounding countryside, which is mountainous and covered by thick 
oak forests (see fig. 3). The French army’s strategy of pacification in this area 
consisted in entrenching military units within the towns, from where they could 
launch operations in the surrounding villages and countryside. A principal motivation 
behind this strategy was to cut off the ALN from sources of material support within 
the local population, by securing roads and population centers. School buildings 
were often requisitioned by the army as barracks, operational headquarters and 
interrogation centers. This was the case in Makouda, where the Army occupied one 
courtyard of the school, while classes continued in the remaining facilities (see fig. 4). 
Thus, the schoolteacher and the local army unit were literally neighbors, in constant 
interaction, often in tense negotiation. 
While the army controlled the towns, the ALN remained hidden and mobile 
under cover of mountainous vegetation, depending on small rural enclaves for 
provisions in food. Children from these communities who attended school, thus 
passed on a daily basis from a space in which the ALN could operate, into the town 
controlled by French forces. The position of the teacher was exceptional in that he 
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 Figure 3: Route from Lemmouchia’s home to school in Makouda, © Google. 
Figure 4: Floor-plan of Makouda primary school. 
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was in physical and administrative proximity to the French army (Bouazza reported 
that occasionally he would have lunch with the commanding lieutenant next door), 
while also being in daily interaction with the children of the surrounding countryside, 
who themselves were part of a wide network of logistic support for the ALN. It was 
by virtue of being placed at this social intersection that Bouazza was able to supply 
the ALN with information. 
4 Conclusion 
There exists an optimistic liberal inclination to consider the fields of education and 
conflict as inherently opposed to one another. However, the Algerian War of 
Independence encroached deep into the field of the Republican school. It is perhaps 
not surprising that schools in Algeria during the war became a space of conflict 
between the Army and teachers. Structurally, they already constituted spaces of 
conflict between the state and the governed population. Gerold Grace argues that 
“the sociology of the schools of the urban working class is inextricably associated 
with conflict – of class and culture, of ideologies and social processes” (p. 29). The 
same can be said of colonial schools. In support of his claim, Grace reviews a 
number of militaristic metaphors employed by English Victorian educationalists, 
comparing schools to citadels and teachers as soldiers. This notion is also advanced 
by Louis Althusser in his analysis of schools as the primary vector of the dominant 
ideology of control within society. These Ideological State Apparatuses, he argues, 
are “not only what is at stake, but also the locus of class conflict” (1976, p. 24). Once 
that conflict escalated into violence in Algeria, teachers were situated in the firing 
line. 
If the French security services were particularly wary of the teaching corps it is 
because the French counter-insurgency campaign was based on a strategy of winning 
hearts and minds (Comité Armée-Jeunesse Algérie, 1960; Khane, 2002). Classrooms 
were a key instrument within that strategy. David Galula, the leading counter-
insurgency theorist to emerge from the ranks of the French Army during the war, 
urges: 
“Open a school in every occupied village with one or two soldiers as 
teachers. Ask the villagers to send at least one 8 to 12-year-old boy 
from each family; next, ask that girls attend school in the same way (if 
room is lacking, the boys in the morning, the girls in the afternoon). 
Every absence must be justified.” [Galula, 2006, p. 285] 
The Ministry of Education strongly embraced this strategy, perhaps in part because it 
raised its profile within the state: “the creation of schools, demanded by the Algerian 
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population, is one of the surest methods we have to win over minds and to oppose 
the propaganda directed against us in this region” (Minister of Education, 1955). 
However, the risk in this context was that left-wing teachers might use that platform 
to propagate subversive ideologies favorable to decolonization. While fighting the 
rebellion without, the army also had to fight subversion from within, in order to 
preserve the school network as an instrument of governance and linguistic/cultural 
dominance. It is perhaps surprising today to think that teachers (usually primary 
school teachers) were attributed such influence. However, the strategic position of 
teachers in the French system of state governance, as well as their social position 
amongst Muslim Algerians was much higher than that currently observable today. 
Since the foundation of the national teaching corps (les hussards noirs) in the 1870’s, 
teachers had been constructed as representatives of Republican moral and epistemic 
authority (Green, 1990; Dubreucq, 2004). In Algeria, this image of authority was 
reinforced by colonial power relations. In his memoirs, FLN leader Hocine Aït 
Ahmed (2009) identifies an inspirational teacher he had, Monsieur Thomé, as a key 
figure in his political awakening. He recalls from his childhood that Algerians around 
him had great esteem for teachers above all other French bureaucrats. Fazia Feraoun 
(1982), in her historical ethnography of a primary school in rural Kabylie, also notes 
the high esteem which villagers had for teachers, an esteem she compares with that 
previously reserved for the marabout. So successful was the cultural encroachment of 
the French school within this village that in the 1930’s villagers began to refer to the 
school bell in order to tell time. Using the school bell as a time reference is 
historically significant in that it marks a temporal reorganization of village life in 
favor of a French secular model, and reflects cultural positioning in ‘time clashes’ 
between city hall and church bells in rural France at this time.13 
There exists a dialectical tension within the project of state education. State 
education is both hegemonic, insofar as it conveys a state-sanctioned ideology, and 
liberating insofar as it distributes resources of knowledge and critical reflection which 
can be used to negotiate or oppose a governing polity. Such a dialectic was 
particularly fragile in the Algerian context, where the discourse of a Republican 
education had to be be maintained within an explicitly colonial society. Teachers’ 
central role in managing that dialectic on the ground positioned them as the keystone 
in the project of cultural colonialism — and insofar as France ruled Algeria by means 
                                                
13 On the politics of clocks and time-telling, see: Morelli and Dierkens, 2008. 
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of cultural domination, dissident teachers represented a distinct threat to French rule 
in Algeria. 
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